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STELLINGEN 
 
Behorende bij het proefschrift 
 
Signaling games: Theory and Applications 
 
 
 
 
1. You play a signaling game when you like to know a secret about someone, but the 
only way to learn about the secret is to interpret her message.  
 
2. When she has enough different messages available, you may be able to get perfectly 
informed about the secret.  
 
3. A signaling game is related to a graph with nodes and arcs, for example, an electronic 
circuit. Whether you can fully learn about her secret is the same problem as whether 
you can draw a graph of which the set of arcs satisfies a certain property. 
 
4. When there are many different dimensions in her secret, it is not generally possible 
for you to fully learn about it through her message. But, in some cases it is doable.  
 
5. In the early 1990s, Russia chose to distribute vouchers to all people as a mean of 
selling state-owned firms. People could trade away their vouchers immediately or 
purchase more vouchers and later exchange them for shares of the firm. It was not a 
good idea.  
 
6. It is no contribution to economics when human behaviour gets lost in the set of 
equations.  
 
7. Economics is the painful elaboration of the obvious. 
 
8. "Economists do it with models." 
 
9. Q: Why did God create economists?  A: In order to make weather forecasters look 
good.  
 
10. It is not true that all Stellingen include negative statements about the Netherlands, 
although it is true that my Dutch landlord did not return the deposit without any 
explanation. 
